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TOWARDS A COHERENT AND WORKABLE ANTITRUST
POLICY ON VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
Daniel J. Gifford*& Robert T. Kudrle**

INTRODUCTION

Practitioners and observers of antitrust law commonly say that, since
the "antitrust revolution" that brought more rigorous microeconomics in the
1970s, vertical restraints have been governed by a rule of reason. Yet we
all know that such statements paint with a broad brush, and that a more
precise and accurate picture would identify a range of (sometimes conflicting) criteria that courts use to assess the lawfulness of the principal kinds of
vertical restraints. This article considers exclusive-supply arrangements,
loyalty and bundled discounts and rebates, and tying arrangements.
In evaluating exclusive-supply arrangements, the courts typically
speak of percentage "foreclosure," but their decisions appear to turn on
other factors, such as the presence or absence of market power.' The criteria applied in loyalty and bundled rebate cases are currently in flux and
inconsistent. Recently, some courts have been attempting to apply the
Brooke Group's price/cost test' outside of the predatory context in which it
originated to other restraints such as exclusive-supply contracts and bundled discounts. Courts evaluating tying arrangements apply a nominal per
se rule, applicable when the defendant possesses "market power" in the
tying product market (which currently is understood to mean something
more than a 30% share).3 This per se treatment is widely recognized as
unsatisfactory. Indeed, tying cases have been in need of rational standards
for decades.

Robins Kaplan Emeritus Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
Orville & Jane Freeman Professor of International Trade & Investment Policy, Humphrey
School of Public Affairs and the Law School, University of Minnesota.
" and Consumer Harm, 70 ANTITRUST
1 Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusive Dealing, "'Foreclosure,
L.J. 311, 311 (2002).
2 See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-24 (1993).
The Brooke Group predation standard requires sales below an appropriate measure of cost and a likelihood of recoupment. It is the first part of the Brooke Group test (i.e., relation of price to cost) that has
been the focus of contention in non-predatory pricing contexts.
3 The rule applicable to tying arrangements is called a per se rule by the courts, but it differs from
other per se rules in that its application is dependent upon proof of market power, which can involve an
extensive economic investigation and proof. This makes its application resemble that of rule of reason.
See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 34-35 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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The state of affairs over these vertical restraints has stimulated attempts to uncover underlying principles. During the latter years of the
Bush administration, the Justice Department proposed a restatement of the
application of Section 2 to unilateral conduct, much of which was directed
toward vertical restraints.4 The Antitrust Modernization Commission reviewed antitrust law, made recommendations on a number of issues, including, inter alia, the antitrust evaluation of bundled discounts.' The European
Commission has proposed a restatement of principles underlying Article
102 (dealing with unilateral conduct).6 Various commentators have responded to the multiplicity of decisional criteria governing vertical restraints by suggesting new ones. Recently, Joshua Wright has proposed a
reformulation of the foreclosure concept In this same spirit, Daniel Crane
and Graciella Miralles have developed a unified approach for evaluating
exclusionary vertical restraints More recently, Thomas Lambert has presented a general approach to exclusionary conduct.' The courts have also
been moving towards a broader use of the Brooke Group predation standard
to assess vertical restraints."
Any attempt to unify or reconceptualize vertical restraints confronts a
major problem in devising safe harbors that are broad enough to satisfy the
urgent need for business firms to contract and otherwise arrange their affairs to carry out their primary business tasks without triggering unforeseen
antitrust liabilities and which are not so narrow as to leave society vulnerable to monopoly-like behavior.
Part I will first discuss some conceptual problems that contribute to the
confusion over verticals. Part II then evaluates the state of U.S. law governing vertical restraints. Part III will examine the special conceptual challenges for policy towards vertical restrictions with differentiated product
4

See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT

UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT (2008).

5 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, Report and Recommendations 94-100 (2007).
6

See generally Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of

the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings (EC), 2009 O.J. (C 45)
[hereinafter EU Guidance].
7

Joshua Wright, Moving Beyond Naive ForeclosureAnalysis, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1163,

1165 (2012).
8 Daniel A. Crane & Graciela Miralles, Toward a Unified Theory of Exclusionary Vertical Restraints, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 607-09 (2011). They stress their focus on exclusionary restraints and
ignore restraints that promote cartelization or price discrimination. Exclusionary restraints are directed
at rivals, preventing or impeding them from competing. Exclusionary restraints are distinguished from
exploitive restraints which generate supra-competitive prices and profits. Exclusionary restraints are the
focus of the present paper as well, although price discrimination receives some attention. They consider
predatory pricing; we do not. We consider such behavior sufficiently distinct to warrant separate analysis.

9 See generally Thomas Lambert, Defining UnreasonablyExclusionary Conduct: The 'Exclusion
ofCompetitive Rival'Approach,92 N.C. L. REV. 1175 (2014).

10 See Jacobson, supranote , at 311-12.
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competition, and Part IV will explore several attempts by other writers to
Part
simplify and unify the law and policy concerning vertical restraints.
V concludes with our own preferred approach.
I.

PERSISTENT AMBIGUITIES

The different U.S. treatment of vertical restrictions over time can be
partially explained by the emergence of the Chicago School antitrust paradigm in the 1970s. But after that paradigm was fully accepted, the courts
continued to apply different analyses to the several recognized types of
vertical restraints: a straightforward rule-of-reason analysis was applied to
territorial and customer restrictions 2 and (after 2007) to vertical price
maintenance agreements, 3 but a "substantial share" version of the rule of
reason was being applied to exclusive-supply contracts, 4 and a per se rule
was applied to tying contracts. 5 Widespread attention to the possibly anticompetitive impact of discounting has been afforded only since the Third
Circuit's 2003 decision in LePage 's. 6
Tying arrangements have long presented a puzzle to antitrust observers. For many years the courts viewed them with deep hostility, repeatedly
asserting that they "serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of
competition." 7 Even today, when the courts have retreated from that extreme hostility, tying arrangements remain subject to a per se rule. Under
that rule, ties entered into by a firm with market power in the market for the
tying product are per se illegal. But modern analysis has established that
tying contracts generally have much more to contribute to the welfare of

11 We

find many insights in Sean P. Gates, Antitrust by Analogy: Developing Rules for Loyalty

Rebates andBundled Discounts, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 99 (2013). A weakness in our view, however, is its
copious use of the term "anticompetitive" without definition. That term is used dozens of times, while
"consumer surplus" appears only once in a footnote. Our approach begins with an assumption that an
increase in consumer (or total) surplus (or perhaps some hybrid) should be the sole aim of competition
policy and that the failure to cleave closely to such a goal invites the time-worn confusion between
protecting competition and protecting competitors. In particular, we take the view that price cutting is
prima facie competitive behavior.
12 See generally Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
13 See generally Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
14 Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tuco Health Care Grp. L.P., 592 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir.
2010); Omega Envtl., Inc., v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 57, 1162 (9th Cir. 1997).
15 Town Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468, 479 (3d Cir. 1992);
Cascade Health Sols., v. PeaceHealth 515 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2008).
16 LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 160 n.14 (3d Cir. 2003).
17 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958) (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949)). In recent years the Court has moved away from such a purely negative view
of tying arrangements. See Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 36 (2006).
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society than has often been recognized, even during recent years." Contrary to the traditional approach to tying, which has looked for "leveraging"
the power of a seller over the tying product, thus disadvantaging consumers
of the tied product, these analysts have shown how a tie could increase the
welfare of both sellers and buyers. 9
Because vertical practices raise antitrust issues only when they affect
the structure of the entire market, we will carefully consider the confusing
term "foreclosure," and the elusive notion of the "equally efficient firm" as
they relate to the evaluation of market structure. These concepts are critical
to modem analyses of vertical restraints; sometimes, however, they raise
more questions than they answer.
Industrial organization economics developed through both its Harvard
and Chicago phases largely without benefit of the "foreclosure" concept.
Indeed, Richard Caves, in his influential introduction to the economics of
industrial organization, observes: "foreclosure defines the event and does
nothing to indicate its significance."2 Justice Breyer has also questioned
the value of the term: "virtually every contract to buy 'forecloses' or 'excludes' alternative sellers from some portion of the market, namely the portion consisting of what was bought."'" "Foreclosure" finds great currency
in legal writing, although Jonathan Jacobson devotes his influential article
to the use of the term without offering a definition."
Instead, he argues
persuasively that the term has been unfortunately aimed at market shares
subject to some vertical restriction when attention should have been focused
on market power. In his widely-discussed article Tying, Foreclosure, and
Exclusion, Michael Whinston also leaves the term undefined.24 The EU
Guidance to Article 82 TFEU (now Article 102) does not really offer a definition either but instead observes that "'anti-competitive foreclosure' is
used to describe a situation where effective access of actual or potential
competitors to supplies or markets is hampered or eliminated as a result of
the conduct of the dominant undertaking whereby the dominant undertaking
is likely to be in a position to profitably increase prices to the detriment of
18

Among the important contributions to a revamped antitrust approach to tying are: Patrick

Greenlee, David Reitman & David S. Sibley, An Antitrust Analysis of Bundled Discounts, 26 INT. J. IND.
ORGAN. 1132 (2008) (their analysis of bundling can be applied to certain tying arrangements), Erik
Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 925
(2010), and Dennis Carlton & Michael Waldman, Upgrades, Switching Costs and the Leverage Theory

of Tying, 122 ECON. J. 675 (2011).
20

19

See, e.g., Greenlee et al., supra note 18; Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 18.
RICHARD E. CAVES, AMERICAN INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, CONDUCT, PERFORMANCE 95 (7th ed.

1993).
21

Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 236 (1st Cir. 1983). Judge Breyer's

approach is cited and discussed in Crane & Miralles, supranote 8, at 633.
22 Jacobson, supra note 1.
23
24

Id. at 312-13.
See Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure,and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837 (1990).

2017]

A COHERENT AND

WORKABLE ANTITRUST POLICY

consumers." 25 This is useful, but it still leaves open the broader meaning of
foreclosure.
Our reading of the literature suggests three broad categories of the use
of "foreclosure." First, there is "trivial" foreclosure, which, at the limit,
means merely that any sale by one firm prevents that sale from going to
another. By extension, trivial foreclosure can also refer to the use of such
practices as exclusive dealing (or loyalty discounting with similar results) in
highly competitive downstream markets. The upstream seller may indeed
have market power, but its vertical practices may make a negligible contribution to the increase or maintenance of that power. A second important
use of the term will be called "limiting" foreclosure, a characteristic of
market structure that, with various degrees of obduracy, limits entry or expansion of challenging firms into some or all of a market. This is a situation in which resellers sometimes make a significant complementary contribution to the market power of the incumbent seller or sellers and for that
reason may exercise varying degrees of market power of their own.26 Limiting foreclosure is cumulative: when several firms employ exclusive supply contracts or other similar devices, the aggregate effect may bar entry
and reinforce an effective supplier oligopoly. But, the mere extent of exclusive dealing in a market is typically called "foreclosure," whether it is
trivial or limiting. Finally, there is what we will call "strategic" foreclosure, which seems to be what the EU Guidance attempts to capture. This is
a situation resulting from specific purposeful conduct by a dominant firm
(or firms) against its-usually easily identified-would-be or struggling
rivals. Michael Whinston uses "strategic foreclosure" in his influential
demonstration of the use of tying by a single dominant firm to prevent profitable activity by a challenger.27 Indeed, many of the "post-Chicago" economic models showing the possible harm of various types of vertical arrangements posit a game between one dominant firm and a challenger.28 In
contrast, limiting foreclosure may develop across an industry over time as a
result of successful attempts by major market participants to increase market penetration at each other's expense with the prevention of entry or the

25

EU Guidance, supranote 6, at

26

The economics literature deals extensively with buyers or coalitions of buyers that share in the

19.

market power of an incumbent dominant supplier. See generally, e.g., Robert Innes & Richard J. Sexton, Strategic Buyers and Exclusionary Contracts, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 566 (1994). Dominant suppliers
theoretically lack power to impose exclusive agreements on coordinated buyers, but collective-action
problems vitiate buyers' resistance. See NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 457 F.3d 534, 550 (6th Cir. 2006).
27 Whinston, supra note 24, at 840. We considered the use of the term "monopoloid" instead of
"strategic" to stress that the distinguishing feature was unity of purpose towards challengers rather than
the number of incumbents, but we decided on the more intuitive term.
28 See, e.g., Eric B. Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer & John Shepard Wley Jr., Naked Exclusion, 81
AM. ECON. REV. 1137 (1991).
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elimination of weak players as only collateral results.29 Limiting foreclosure may nonetheless increase barriers to entry and impede effective competition while not aiming specifically at entrants.
The legal literature on vertical restrictions appears to overemphasize
one entry barrier, economies of scale, to the neglect of others, particularly
the attraction of "brand" in differentiated-product markets. Barriers to entry were first systematically explored by Joe Bain in the 1940s and 1950s." °
Bain wrote of economies of scale, absolute cost, and product differentiation
barriers that allow incumbents to charge prices persistently in excess of
their costs without attracting new firms to the industry.3' Some of Bain's
conceptualizations have been very effectively criticized, especially by
George Stigler, who defined entry barriers as costs incurred by entrants that
were not incurred by incumbents.32 It is not necessary to pursue that theoretical dispute here. A widely neglected insight from the barriers literature,
however, with strong implications for vertical restraint policy, is that buyer
brand preferences in differentiated-product markets constitute advantages to
a dominant incumbent that may-or may not-take considerable time or
expense to erode. This, in turn, raises uncertainty and the cost of capital for
the entrant. Accordingly, our analysis will take into account brand preferences and differentiated-product competition where an examination of these
factors is necessary to a proper evaluation of vertical restraints. Typically,
both judicial and scholarly approaches to vertical restraints simply
acknowledge these preferences without adequately examining how they
complicate the analysis. The almost exclusive emphasis in the literature on
economies of scale as a barrier obscures the pervasive competitive importance of product differentiation barriers based on entrenched purchaser
brand preferences. In particular, because the equally-efficient firm approach smooths over or ignores brand preferences, this preoccupation with
scale misleadingly suggests that the equally-efficient firm approach has far
broader applicability than is warranted.

29 The foreclosures considered by the Court in Standard Stations, both the 6.7% represented by
Standard's exclusive contracts and the exclusive contracts by Standard's rivals, probably constituted
limited foreclosure. Since neither Standard's nor its rivals individually controlled a sufficient share of
distribution to threaten any rival supplier, any foreclosure could not have constituted "strategic" foreclosure. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 295 (1949).
30

See JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1956).

31

Id.

32

GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 70 (1968). For some of the main criti-

cisms of Bain and altemative definitions of entry barriers, see R. Preston McAfee, Hugo Mialon, &
Michael Williams, What is a Barrierto Entry?, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 461-62 (2004).
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THE STATE OF U.S. LAW

II.

Most current vertical-restraint controversies involve alleged "foreclosures" imposed by exclusive-supply arrangements, loyalty or bundled rebates or ties. These kinds of restraints are widely employed competitive
marketing mechanisms, often having the effect of both reducing the buyer's
price and reducing the seller's cost. Antitrust issues arise only in unusual
situations where firms with market power use them to generate exclusionary effects that eclipse their pro-competitive impact.
The case law under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the
Clayton Act recognizes pro-competitive effects of exclusive-supply contracts by providing an effective safe harbor to exclusive-supply contracts
that involve 40% or less of the market, making such shares "insubstantial. ' '3' As market share grows larger, however, a supplier becomes increasingly vulnerable to a charge of unlawful foreclosure. The presence of fac34
tors, such as the market power of the supplier (emphasized by Jacobson),
the length of the supply contract, substitute sources of supply, and barriers
to the entry of competing suppliers then become relevant. At even higher
levels of alleged foreclosure, a plaintiff may invoke the monopolization and
attempted monopolization clauses of Section 2 of the Sherman Act 35 , where
the antitrust evaluation continues to be governed by these same factors.
The ultimate issue in an exclusive-supply case is the extent to which supplier competition remains open and viable. Some cases have indicated that
foreclosure will become unlawful when, inter alia, the foreclosure denies
entrants or other rivals the minimum viable scale required to operate in a
concentrated market.36
A recurring issue in exclusive-supply cases concerns the lawfulness of
a dominant supplier capturing the most efficient distribution systems for
itself. Does this raise antitrust concerns? Many courts have answered this
question negatively, but the opinion of the D.C. Circuit in the Microsoft
antitrust case, in which the firm pressured service providers to favor its
internet browser, supports the contrary view.37 Where a dominant supplier
has captured the most efficient distribution system, the supplier gains a cost
33 McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 837 (11th Cir. 2015).
34

See generally, Jacobson, supranote 1, at 326-28.

31 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
36 ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 271 (3d Cir. 2012); Theme Promotions, Inc. v.
News Am. Mktg. FSI, 546 F.3d 991, 1003 (9th Cir. 2008); In re Hypodermic Prod. Antitrust Litig.,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47437 (D.N.J. 2007).
37 U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 64, 70-71 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (recognizing unlawfulness of
exclusion carried out by relegating rival to less efficient distribution system and implicitly raising its
costs). See also LePage's v. 3M Corp., 324 F.3d 141, 160 n.14 (3d Cir. 2003); Natchitoches Par. Hosp.
Serv. Dist, v. Tyco Int'l, Ltd., No. l:-5-CV-12024-PBS, 2009 WL 4061631, at *7-8 (D. Mass. Nov. 20,
2009).
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advantage from the distribution contracts that may not be due to its own
efficiencies, but that arises from the efficiencies of the distributors with
whom it has contracted. Analogously, when a supplier's product is strongly
favored over competing substitutes, the supplier can further impede the
distribution of competing products by requiring exclusivity from its own
dealers, as was done in Dentsply3" and McWane.39 This technique uses the
attractiveness of the supplier's product to its dealers as a means of denying
rivals access to those dealers who want to carry additional products.
Although exclusivity prevents free-riding and ensures the alignment of
dealer incentives with those of the supplier, at some point these procompetitive effects may be offset by the boost to supplier-level competition
that would result from the elimination of exclusivity. This analysis fits the
raising rivals' costs paradigm outlined by Thomas Krattenmaker and Steven
Salop in the 1980s and has since been absorbed into mainstream analysis.4"
Such focus on the characteristics of the distribution systems over which the
defendant has obtained exclusive rights also fits nicely within the framework of the existing law which has long been concerned with scarcity of
distribution as an entry barrier. If distribution systems were unavailable to
an entrant, the entrant or potential entrant would have to enter on both the
supplier and distribution levels, thus incurring significant extra costs. Microsoft incorporates this same concern (of raising rivals' costs), applying it
to the exclusive-supply context.4'
The competition-thwarting issue raised by loyalty and bundled discount cases is the same as in exclusive-supply cases. Indeed, a loyalty discount, one that is tailored to the situation of the individual buyer, produces
effects almost identical to exclusive-supply contracts, except for the incentives on buyers to adhere to the contract terms. The supplier in both situations typically reduces selling price in return for an exclusivity commitment. In both cases, the exact terms of the agreement typically turn on aspirations of the seller to maximize profits through its ability to price discriminate across buyers interacting with whatever bargaining power the
buyer might have.
In an ordinary exclusive-supply contract, the buyer's penalty for
breaching the contract diminishes over the course of the contract because a
breach will expose it to liability for the seller's lost profits, a measure that
shrinks as the completed deliveries (and accompanying payments) under
the contract increase. As the seller is paid for each delivery, its potential for
losing profits diminishes. By contrast, in a loyalty rebate arrangement, the
rebate earned by the buyer over the entire contract period is paid at the end,
38
39

United States v. Dentsply, Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 184-86 (3d Cir. 2005).
McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 819 (11 th Cir. 2015).

40

Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs

to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986).
41 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 51, 55-56.
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when the buyer has fully performed. A buyer's breach forfeits its rebates
on purchases already made, so that the penalty for a breach grows larger
over the length of the contract period. One way of describing this effect is
to say that the seller is extending its market power from the (contingent)
discount on sales already made into the buyer's growing incentive to continue buying from the same source. 42 Indeed, the contingency governing
loyalty rebates is referred to in Europe as a "suction effect" because of the
heavy pressure on the buyer near the end of the contract period to continue
purchasing from the original supplier.43 The mechanics can generate negative prices that no rational buyer would refuse.' Because of their analytical
similarities, loyalty discounts ought to be treated similarly to exclusivesupply contracts except where the length of the contract is a critical factor.
In those cases, analytical clarity would be served by judicial recognition
that the continually declining penalty for breach in an exclusive-supply
contract makes it ever easier for the buyer to shop elsewhere, while the opposite is true under a loyalty rebate arrangement.
Bundled discounts can generate exclusionary effects by extending
market power in one product to others, sometimes similar to sales expansion generated by single product loyalty discounts, just discussed. In
LePage'sInc. v. 3M, the Third Circuit saw 3M's bundle pricing as a mechanism for excluding LePage's transparent tape. 45 As the court saw it, there
was no way that LePage's could reduce the price of its single product to
offset 3M's reduced prices on the bundle.46 Thus 3M could achieve the
47
In the
results of predatory pricing without selling any item below cost.
monopo3M's
of
maintaining
a
means
was
pricing
the
bundle
court's view,
ly on Scotch tape. 48 But the attractiveness of the bundle could also stem not
so much from the seller's monopoly on a product included in the bundle as
simply from the attractiveness of the discount, especially as magnified by
the size of the bundle. In this case, the sales increase would arise from the
desirability of the discount to buyers, inducing them to take a larger bundle
or a bundle including less desirable products, in order to qualify for the
discount on the products that the buyer wants. Of course, if the buyer wants

42

See the discussion of the suction effect in DANIEL J. GIFFORD & ROBERT T. KUDRLE, THE

ATLANTIC DIVIDE IN ANTITRUST: AN EXAMINATION OF US AND EU COMPETITION POLICY

123-25

(2015).
43

EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DG DISCUSSION PAPER ON THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 82 OF THE

TREATY TO EXCLUSIONARY ABUSES 44-45 (2005).

44 Id.
45
46
47

LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 161 (3d Cir. 2003).
Id. at 161.
Id. at 160 n.14. See also Ortho Diagnostic Sys, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455,

467 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (describing the use of bundled discounts to achieve the results of predatory
pricing without selling below cost).
48 LePage'slnc,324 F.3dat 161.
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all the products in the bundle, the bundle pricing reduces to a simple price
reduction (and thus to behavior that is transparently competitive).
The courts and official bodies have been troubled by bundled discounts. In LePage's,the Third Circuit condemned 3M's bundle as monopolization without providing any underlying theory49 . The Antitrust Monopolization Commission (AMC) then created a safe harbor when the discount
on the entire bundle was attributed to a product in which bundler was competing with a plaintiff rival supplier and, under the restructured discount,
the defendant was still pricing above cost.50 Later, the Ninth Circuit in its
PeaceHealth decision, turned the AMC's safe harbor into a test governing
legality.5'
Traditional judicial analysis has also recently come under challenge by
a test based on the concept of an equally-efficient competitor. Do the contracts at issue prevent an equally-efficient rival supplier from competing?
This criterion, first developed in predatory pricing analysis and endorsed in
Brooke Group, was expanded in the 1990s beyond predatory pricing. In
1996, it was applied to bundled discounts,52 and recently, the Sixth Circuit
employed this analysis in NicSand, an exclusive-supply case.53 There, the
court thought that NicSand, which was excluded as a supplier by exclusivesupply contracts between 3M and large retailers, had the opportunity to
underbid 3M and thereby gain some or all of the exclusive contracts for
itself. 4 Under this approach, the courts would be taking the criterion of an
equally-efficient competitor from predatory-pricing analysis and using it to
evaluate other restraints that have traditionally been treated as involving
non-price factors. The intuition underlying this approach is that some nonprice restraints can be analytically recast as issues of price competition. In
such cases, the equally-efficient competitor approach could serve to evaluate a range of restraints.
Unfortunately, the equally-efficient competitor standard is ambiguous
for non-homogenous products, even in predatory-pricing contexts. The
judicial operationalization of the concept is in Brooke Group, a predatorypricing case.55 It allows an established firm's own price-cost relation to
49

LePage'slnc, 324F.3dat 169.
50 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, supranote 5, at 99-100.

51

Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 910 (9th Cir. 2008). The AMC used the

discount attribution rule as a safe harbor. If, after attributing the entire discount on the bundle to the
competitive product, the defendant still sold the competitive product above its costs, then the case would
be dismissed. If, after the attribution of the discount, the defendant's price were below its cost, then the
case would proceed to examine the recoupment and market effects of the practice. The Ninth Circuit,
however, made the application of the discount attribution rule a substantive part of the offense. Id. at
910.
52 Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
53 NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2007).
14 Id. at 457.
55 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
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gauge whether a comparable firm would need to price below cost to match
the dominant firm's pricing. 6 But if the established firm can sell a similar
(perhaps functionally indistinguishable) product for a higher price-cost
margin than a competitor because of greater market acceptance, then it may
be able to price above some measure of its own cost while still forcing its
rival to price below its own (the rival's) costs.
The very meaning of "equally efficient" is ambiguous in this context.
If the criterion of efficiency is the generation of willingness to pay relative
to resource use, then a higher cost firm that can sell its product for a greater
excess of price over marginal or average cost (including contemporaneous
promotion expenses) could still be regarded as more efficient. While antitrust law cannot easily incorporate such complexities, it can recognize them
through skepticism about the sufficiency of the equally efficient firm criterion, narrowing the application of that criterion for gauging exclusionary
conduct where appropriate.
Finally, a word about tying. Tying is the only vertical restraint that is
at least nominally subject to a per se rule.57 It has been a subject of antitrust
attention since at least 1914, when Congress called for special scrutiny of
tying arrangements in Section 3 of the Clayton Act. Decades ago, tying
was understood as a form of "leverage," in which the seller used a product
over which it exercised power to force buyers to purchase its brand of another product (which, in the absence of the tie, would be trading competitively).58 Despite the discrediting of this leveraging theory in many contexts, 59 ties have remained subject to a per se rule, albeit with some defenses.

III. THE POLICY CHALLENGE OF DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCT
COMPETITION

The legal literature dealing with vertical restraints tends to focus upon
a minimum efficient scale and generally assumes competition in a homogeneous product or products that are perceived as very similar." Thus that

56

Id. at 227.
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U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 103-04 (2007).

See

also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9, 16-18 (1984); Illinois Tool Works Inc. v.
Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1291-92 (2006).
58 See Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 25
(1957).
59 See Id. Bowman's article is widely believed to have begun the discrediting of leveraging theory.
60

See, e.g., Crane & Miralles, supra note 8, at 608-09; Willard K. Tom, David A. Balto & Neil
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literature does not adequately emphasize the overriding importance of entry
barriers generated by product differentiation in assessing the competitive
consequences generated by vertical restrictions. The American antitrust
cases have not recently explored the role of brand loyalty in differentiatedproduct competition.6 1 The EU, however, has attempted to address the issue, particularly through the European Commission and its Guidance on
abuses of a dominant position.62 The European approach posits that buyers
sometimes cannot switch all of their purchases from a dominant firm to a
rival supplier63 because of the demand of their own customers (i.e., the customers of the purchasers from the dominant firm). These customers want
the dominant firm's "brand."'
In European parlance, this constriction of
the choice of a buyer (from a dominant firm) is described as the buyer's
"non-contestable" or "required" share because it is effectively reserved to
the original supplier.65 The amount of a buyer's purchases that is open to
alternative suppliers is referred to as its "contestable" share.66 As noted, the
suction effect continuously reduces the effective price of new purchases.67
When brand preference generates a non-contestable share, this suction effect is enhanced because all of the customer's purchases (including its noncontestable purchases) generate contingent discounts. Thus, when the customer is free from brand preference considerations to buy the remaining
amounts that it needs, it will also have acquired conditional discounts that
may further effectively bind it to its original supplier. The European Commission approaches this problem by first determining whether the targeted
discounting practiced by the dominant firm yields an effective price6" below
its own costs at a sales volume within the contestable range of total sales to
a given buyer.69 This effectively is the equally-efficient competitor approach modified to accommodate a differentiated-product market. If the
Commission determines the effective price of the sales to be below the sellDealing,67 ANTITRUST L.J. 615, 623-24 (2000); Wright, supra note 7, at 1166, 1185: Lambert, supra
note 9, at 1211.
61 In the 1970s and 1980s, the FTC was exploring brand preferences and differentiated-product
competition. See Borden Inc. v. FTC, 674 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1982); Kellogg Co., [1970-73 Transfer
Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
19,898; Ethyl Corp., [1976-80 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH)

21,579. See Richard Schmalensee, Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry, 9
BELL J. ECON. 305 (1978).
62 EU Guidance, supra note 6.
63 The text treats market competition as between one incumbent and one challenger, but with

additional complexity-and greater uncertainly for all concerned-the argument applies to more than
one incumbent and two or more challengers.

64 EU Guidance, supra note 6, at 36.
65
66
67
68

See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 43, at $T 155-56 (defining "required share").
See EU Guidance, supra note 6, at 42 (defining "contestable share").
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 43, at 44-45.
An effective price in this circumstance is the list price less the discounts to which the buyer is

entitled.
69 EU Guidance, supra note 6, at 77 41-44.
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er's costs, it will deem rival firms to have been foreclosed and will assess
the legal significance of that strategic or limiting foreclosure under its
standards relating to consumer harm.7"
This analytical framework needs a closer look. The European Commission analysis implies that the supposed problem of loyalty discounts
affecting single-product competition may actually involve (at least) two
products, if products are defined as suggested in the U.S. merger guidelines:
the ability to raise prices above cost by some substantial percentage for a
sustained period.7' Part of the dominant firm's demand is quite inelastic
because of its "must have" attraction, which makes that part of its sales
largely immune to competition from substitutes; another part is more elastic
where it competes in a segment of the market where customers lack a
strong brand preference. So viewed, the price/cost test, which is often a
powerful analytical tool, can produce misleading analysis. Because the
incumbent in a differentiated product market will often enjoy a product
acceptance advantage over a challenger's product, using its own discounted
price to calculate an effective price relative to its costs may not accurately
72
reflect the disadvantage of a firm with similar costs but weaker demand.
Moreover, differentiated products may be produced at dissimilar costs.
Another source of uncertainty lies in the estimate of what is "contestable."
If the incumbent makes a generous assumption about the competitive potential of the challenging firm, it can justify a higher cumulative rebate percentage than would otherwise be the case even if its price-cost relation at
any given scale is the same as its competitor. When these ambiguities are
combined, they may challenge the persuasiveness of the as-efficientcompetitor approach, despite its innovative character.
We conclude that the European Commission has developed the antitrust significance of differentiated-product competition and brand preference in ways that go beyond current U.S. analysis. But the European
Commission so far has not pursued the critical related questions that affect
the applicability of the approach: How do the price-cost margins of the incumbent firm compare with those of the challenger? What are the attractions of the "non-contestable" share and how obdurate are they? What is
the minimum efficient (or viable) scale of the challenger?
70
71
72

EU Guidance, supranote 6, at 20.
DANIEL GIFFORD & ROBERT KUDRLE, THE ATLANTIC DIVIDE IN ANTITRUST 126-27 (2015).
For an insightful article anticipating some of the Commission's analysis, see Willard K. Tom,

David A. Balto, & Neil W. Averitt, Anticompetitive Aspects of Market-Share Discounts and Other
Incentives to Exclusive Dealing, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 615, 628 (2000). For a discussion of price premia
of branded grocery goods, see Johan Anselmsson, Ulf Johansson, Antonio Maranon, & Niklas Persson,
The Penetration of Retailer Brands and the impact on Consumer Prices-A Study Based on Household
Expendituresfor 35 Grocery Categories, 15 J. RETAILING & CONSUMER SERVs. 42 (2008). For a discussion focusing on computer components, see R. Venkatesh & Vijay Mahajan, Products with Branded
Components: An Approach for Premium Pricing and Partner Selection, 16 MARKETING SCI. 146
(1997).
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While the European antitrust stance on loyalty discounts differs from
the usual U.S. treatment, there is reason to believe that the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) has been influenced by the European analysis, particularly in its proceeding against Intel's loyalty discounts.73 While the FTC's
Intel case was settled, these events suggest that some version of the European approach may ultimately be litigated in U.S. courts. In differentiated
product markets where some portion of a buyer's purchases are "must
haves," the European Commission-and perhaps the FTC-views that situation as the supplier using its power over a "must have" brand (part of the
customer's "required share" in European parlance) to its advantage in the
"contestable" part of its demand, where in the absence of the rebates, alternative suppliers could compete for the customer's patronage. Underlying
this analysis is the fact that the European Commission-and perhaps the
FTC-looks at loyalty rebates as analogous to ties, whereby the dominant
supplier is able to use its power over the customer's required share to pressure the customer to divert purchases in the contestable range from alternative suppliers to that same dominant supplier.74
The case for applying the "as efficient competitor test" outside of the
predatory pricing context depends both on acceptance of the abstract criterion and the feasibility of applying it to various other restraints. The issues
raised by first point are often ignored: they concern tradeoffs between consumer welfare and efficiency. Preserving high-cost suppliers can act as a
check on the pricing of a dominant supplier and thus help to preserve consumer welfare but at the cost of a resource misallocation that reduces aggregate welfare. We recognize these effects but reject the social waste inherent in such a strategy as deviating from the efficiency goals of antitrust.
Current law reflects the logic that a firm need not price above some measure of its own costs.7" Although some commentators object,76 we think that

73

In re Intel, Corp., Docket No. 9341, (FTC

Oct. 29, 2010). The original FTC complaint attacked Intel for not charging prices sufficient to contribute to the recovery of its sunk costs. The consent
decree seems to have abandoned this position, although a version of long run incremental cost as a
minimum price standard has been suggested by some economists. See William J. Baumol, Predation
and the Logic of the Average Variable Cost Test, 39 J. L. & ECON. 49 (1996); Patrick Bolton, Joseph F.
Brodley, & Michael H. Riordan. PredatoryPricing:Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L. J.
2239 (2000).
74 See EU Guidance,supra note 6, at

39 ("A conditional rebate granted by a dominant undertaking may enable it to use the 'non-contestable' portion of the demand of each customer (that is to say, the
amount that would be purchased by the customer from the dominant undertaking in any event) as leverage to decrease the price to be paid for the 'contestable' portion of demand (that is to say, the amount
for which there are price-attractive substitutes).").
75 The same factors that can lead to a permissive price-cost test for established sellers in rebate
analysis also applies in predatory pricing situations.
76 See Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost PredatoryPricing, Ill YALE L.J. 941 (2002).
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standard embodied in current law is sound and should be
the efficiency
77
maintained.

The use of an analytic framework for bundled discount analysis based
on that of predatory pricing is evident in Ortho, a case litigated in the
Southern District of New York in the mid-1990s, where the court was able
to dismiss that bundled discount case because all products were being sold
above cost and the plaintiff remained profitable. Another attempt to employ a logic similar to that of Brooke Group can be seen in the Antitrust
Modernization Commission's proposal for dealing with bundled discounts:
a safe harbor is provided when all of a bundled discount is applied to the
competitive product and that product is still sold above cost by the defendant. 79 Many others have devised schemes of varying permissiveness towards the bundled sales by a firm with one or more monopolized products."o
There are classes of cases where the "as efficient competitor test" does
not work even when prices and costs between a dominant firm and a challenger are sufficiently similar to make a Brooke Group-like test possible.
Dentsply, Eaton, and Mc Wane are recent examples.8 '
The as-efficient-competitor approach asks whether a rival could avoid
foreclosure by offering a more attractive price than the incumbent. If the
rival is as efficient, it can match or undercut the incumbent. In the cited
cases, this was impossible for reasons unrelated to the relative efficiencies
of the incumbent and its rivals. Dentsply was the dominant supplier with
67% of the market for artificial teeth.82 Dentsply's popularity with dental
labs and its consequent sales volume enhanced its attractiveness to dealers,
who understood that handling the Dentsply line helped to ensure their own
high volume of sales. 3 As a consequence of the high volume of Dentsply
dealers, those dealers were likely to attain a higher level of efficiency than
dealers in competing brands.84 Thus, a rival supplier could not just underbid Dentsply for a dealer's patronage. The dealer would also have to be
compensated for losing access to a high-selling product and the efficiency
77

In fact, it suggests a defacto partial recognition of a total surplus standard. For a more general

discussion of the way the two standards apply to U.S. antitrust, see Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz,
The Economics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust, 2 COMPETITION POLICY INT'L 2 (2006).
78 Ortho Diagnostic Sys, Inc. v. Abbott Labs,, Inc., 920 F.Supp. 455, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
79 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 99-100.
80 See, e.g., Thomas A. Lambert, Appropriate Liability Rules for Tying and Bundled Discounting,
72 OHIO STATE L. J. 1 (2011); Daniel A. Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Consumer Welfare, 55 EMORY L. J. 423 (2006).
81 United States v. Dentsply, Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005); ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton
Corp., 696 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012); McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814 (11 th Cir. 2015).
82 Dentsply's share was 67% on a unit basis and 75-80% on a revenue basis. Dentsply, 399 F.3d

at 184.
83

Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 185.
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Id. at 192.
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loss that would accompany its defection from Dentsply. Dentsply is thus a
case where the demand for the supplier's product probably made the pricecost test unworkable, as there may have been no feasible price at which a
rival supplier could have offered its product to dealers that would have been
more attractive to a Dentsply dealer than the combination of price and
product volume (and consequent dealer profit) offered by Dentsply.
Notice that the central determining factor is that Denstply's product
was favored over the products of other sellers by both dealers and dental
labs.85 Dentsply thus involves differentiated-product competition. Although rival manufacturers might have made inroads over time, restrictions
within the distribution system made such a gradual encroachment on
Dentsply far more difficult by allowing the combination of final purchaser
brand acceptance, established distributor appeal, and distributor economies
of scale to reinforce each other. Any price-cost analysis done on the basis
of Dentsply's own price and cost data would be essentially worthless.
Eaton is similar to Dentsply in that the price-cost test does not work
there either, albeit for different reasons. The Eaton case involved supply
contracts between Eaton, the principal North American supplier of heavyduty truck transmissions, and all four of the North American manufacturers
that were direct-purchasers of these transmissions.86 Most of the supply
contracts at issue ran for five-year terms, although one ran for seven years.87
These contracts contained rebate provisions conditioned upon the buyer's
purchases from Eaton reaching target percentages of its (the buyer's) entire
requirements.88 These percentages were generally around 90% except in
the case of Volvo, which manufactured some its own transmissions.89 The
agreements with two manufacturers (Freightliner and Volvo) also provided
that Eaton could withdraw from the arrangement if the targets were not
met.9" Eaton had entered into these contracts during a period in which the
market for heavy-duty trucks was contracting and in which its monopoly
over heavy-duty truck transmissions was being challenged by the plaintiff,
ZF Meritor, a joint venture between Meritor and ZF AG, a European trucktransmission manufacturer.9" Due to the supply contracts, the market share
of the joint venture dropped from 17% in 1999 to 8% in 2003, below the
joint venture's understanding of its minimum efficient scale, and the joint
venture withdrew from the market and dissolved.92 Two years later, the

85
86

Id.
ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 265 (3d Cir. 2012).

87

Id. at 286-87.

88 Id. at 265.
89 Id. at 284-85.
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Id. at 265.
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Eaton, 696 F.3d at 264-65.

92 Id. at 264, 267.
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market share of Meritor, which stayed in the market after the dissolution of
the joint venture, fell to 4% and it also left the market.93
ZF Meritor brought a monopolization case against Eaton, relying partially on the Sixth Circuit's NicSand decision. 4 Eaton contended that its
behavior was lawful since it had not sold transmissions below cost.95 The
Third Circuit in Eaton treated these contracts as de facto exclusive-supply
contracts and applied the law that it believed applied to exclusive contracts.96 Because, in the court's view, price was not the predominant method of exclusion, it refused to apply the price/cost test.97 Rather, the court
ruled that the lawfulness of these contracts was governed by the rule of
reason which, as applied to exclusive-supply contracts, asked whether the
contracts foreclosed more than a substantial share of the market to the seller's rivals.98
The Third Circuit was correct in 2012 to reject the price/cost test in
Eaton. When Eaton announced that it might withhold supplies from those
manufacturers who purchased from Eaton's European rival, there was no
price that the rival could have offered to any of Eaton's customers that
would have offset their loss by switching.99 Because the North American
heavy truck manufacturers needed Eaton's product (heavy-duty transmissions) in most of their own production, they had to accept the terms on
which Eaton conditioned its continuing sales.' 9 Eaton, like Dentsply and
Mc Wane, is an example of an exclusive relationship between a supplier and
its customers that is so much in the interest of the participating customers
that these customers cannot be wooed away by feasible supply-price adjustments. Even though the transmissions were being purchased by professional buyers, no truck manufacturer could risk a complete abandonment of
a supplier with an established record in favor of a new source just because it
was cheaper. Hence, all of the truck-makers were faced with all or nothing
offers that they could not refuse, and the entrant could not encroach on the
incumbent. "'
Finally, in the most recent exclusive-supply case, Mc Wane, a firm that
dominates approximately 90% of the market for domestic pipe fittings to9'

Id. at 267.

94 Id.
9' Id. at 278.
96

id.
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Eaton, 696 F.3d, at 279-80.

98 Id. at281.
99
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Id. at 278.

Id.
Id.at 335-36 (Stating that under the distribution contracts, Eaton offered a discount to each of

the buyers which was paid in the form a rebate conditioned upon the buyer meeting a purchasing target.
This cast the arrangement in a loyalty-contract mode. The court, however, chose to focus on the contractual provisions that permitted Eaton to terminate its supplier role if a purchaser failed to meet its
purchasing target.).
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gether with two other major suppliers, imposed exclusivity on all of its distributors."2 According to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), McWane's
purpose was to impede the growth of a rival, Star Pipe Products, that had
entered the domestic pipe fittings market." 3 The FTC saw McWane's imposition of exclusivity on its dealers as monopoly maintenance."
Although fittings are considered commodities in the industry," 5 McWane's
distributors accepted the exclusivity that McWane imposed on them, even
rejecting a larger rebate from Star, apparently because of concerns about the
adequacy of Star's inventory, its quality, and the timeliness of delivery.0 6
Thus, McWane's power in the domestic fittings market was the result, not
of the characteristics of its product, but of the confidence of buyers in the
attributes of McWane, their supplier. Like Dentsply and Eaton, McWane is
a case where the price/cost test does not work.
Overall, the "as efficient competitor" standard cannot provide a sufficient basis for a unified theory on vertical restraints because, as we have
shown, that test does not work in a range of cases (like Dentsply, Eaton,
and Mc Wane) where customers are unwilling to switch suppliers for feasible compensation. Where the test works (such as in circumstances like
NicSand), however, it can play a role in an overall approach to rationalizing
vertical restraint analysis.
IV.

PROPOSALS FOR REVISING THE STANDARDS GOVERNING VERTICAL
RESTRAINTS

We now consider several other options that aim towards a general approach to evaluating vertical restrictions: (1) the approach of the European
Commission embodied in its Guidance governing the application of what is
now Article 102 of Treaty on the Functioning of European Union; (2) a
recent proposal by Crane and Miralles; (3) the approach suggested by FTC
Commissioner Wright; (4) a proposal by Thomas Lambert; and (5) our approach. Although this article is primarily focused on American antitrust
law, we have included a consideration of the European Commission's
Guidance because (1) the European approach to antitrust issues in this area
has been highly elaborated, (2) the Crane and Miralles proposal draws
heavily from the Guidance, and (3) there is ground for believing that the
FTC may well be disposed towards incorporating some of the EU approach.

102
103
'04
105
106
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The European Commission Guidance

A.

The EU Guidance (the "Guidance") sets forth the standards that the
Commission intends to use in enforcing the Article 102 prohibition of abuses of dominant position.0 7 It deals with both price-based and non-price
based exclusionary conduct and devotes several pages to specific forms of
abuse, including all of the practices considered in this article.0 8 When dealing with price-based exclusionary conduct, the Guidance uses the "as efficient competitor" standard." 9 Under that approach, the Guidance asks
whether an as-efficient competitor would be able to match a dominant
firm's offers without selling below cost."0 Since the rival is required to be
a competitor who is "as efficient" as the dominant firm, the question posed
is whether the dominant firm is selling below its own costs."' If the dominant firm is not selling below its costs, the Commission concludes that there
is no adverse impact on competition." 2 The Commission employs this apIn
proach when dealing with predation, loyalty rebates, and bundling.'
reverts
Commission
the
evaluating non-price based exclusionary conduct,
to inquiring whether "effective access of actual or potential competitors to
supplies or markets is hampered or eliminated," enabling the dominant firm
to increase prices."'
The European Commission has used its "as efficient competitor"
standard in its approach to differentiated-product competition despite the
fact that the branded offerings of various firms may command widely different shares and may sell at varying prices." 5 Moreover, the Commission's approach simply posits a need to determine non-contestability without an exploration of its causes or its vulnerability to erosion. Nevertheless,
the Commission's development of the "suction effect" and its recognition
of both brand-specific and more general demands by the same buyer is
challenging U.S. (and other) enforcement agencies to develop their analyses
of differentiated-product competition." 6
107
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See also EU Guidance, supra note 6, at
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(stating that exclusive dealing by dominant firms, which may involve a market share as little as 40%, is
generally illegal).
114 Id at 19.
115 The European Commission's Discussion Paper at 33 describes the characteristics of differenThe competition between Intel and AMD illustrates a circumstance in
which one company (Intel) possesses greater market acceptance than its rival (AMD). Intel apparently
generally sold at higher prices than AMD. See Crane & Miralles, supranote 8, at 648.
116 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 43, 44-45.
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Much of the Commission's Guidance is directed to the economic incentives affecting a particular customer's purchasing decisions rather than
to the market effects of the practice, and this may seem problematic. But
this is the whole point of the suction effect: it tells us about the incentives
of a particular customer to keep dealing with the same supplier. If all customers are similar and make similar purchasing decisions, then we could
generalize from the impact of rebates on a particular buyer to their impact
on the entire market. If the buyer in question is a highly representative
buyer, this may be possible, but the generalizability of the Commission's
analysis of a particular buyer to the overall market impact is not always
apparent.
Despite its greater attention to analyzing the impact of practices, such
as loyalty rebates, on particular customers, the Guidance contains a second
step where the effects of identified restraints on the general market are assessed. The criteria that it employs in this second step resemble those traditionally employed under U.S. law to evaluate exclusive-supply contracts:
"the higher the percentage of total sales in the relevant market affected by
the conduct, the longer its duration, and the more regularly it has been applied, the greater is the likely foreclosure effect."" 7
The Commission most likely would have agreed with the Sixth Circuit's decision in the NicSand case because NicSand permits an easy application of the "as efficient competitor" test."' Eaton, however, can also be
considered using the EU approach. There, the U.S. heavy truck producers
were buying transmissions from both Eaton, their principal supplier, and ZF
Meritor, a new supplier." 9 When Eaton demanded exclusivity, the truck
producers complied because they needed a substantial portion of their supplies from Eaton.'20 The Third Circuit ruled that this coerced exclusivity
constituted monopolization. 2 ' The EU Commission would have reached
the same result. Under the Commission's analysis, that would constitute
the noncontestable part of each buyer's demand.'22 Eaton's use of rebates
in this market might be seen by the Commission as extending its power
over the noncontestable part of each buyer's demand into the contestable
part, thus reducing the contestable demand available to its rival, ZF Meritor.
Stage one of the Commission's Guidance analysis would thus find foreclo117

EU Guidance, supra note 6, at 20. Compare Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S.

320, 329 (1961) ("To determine substantiality in a given case, it is necessary to weigh the probable
effect of the contract on the relevant area of effective competition, taking into account the relative
strength of the parties, the proportionate volume of commerce involved in relation to the total volume of
commerce in the relevant market area, and the probable immediate and future effects which pre-emption
of that share of the market might have on effective competition therein.").
118 NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2007).
119 ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 305 (3d Cir. 2012).
120 Id. at 278.
121 Id. at 285.
122 EU Guidance, supra note 6, at 39.
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sure of Meritor from each of the customers. Stage two would address market impact. Since the foreclosure would have left ZF Meritor with a market
share that apparently was not adequate for it to attain scale economies, and
ZF Meritor was at that point Eaton's only rival, the requisite anticompetitive effect of the market would be established.
Overall, the innovative EU approach disappoints in two major dimensions. First, it fails to consider the complexities that necessarily attend the
application of price-cost testing to the very differentiated products that
seem to concern it the most, and, at the level of the entire market, it offers
little beyond the time-tested "substantial share" standard. Secondly, the EU
approach does not articulate standards for limiting foreclosure, such as aggregate market foreclosure brought about by the independent (noncollusive) actions of several suppliers.
The Crane-MirallesProposal

B.

Crane and Miralles argue that: "[i]n every exclusionary vertical restraints case, the ultimate question should be whether the loyalty-inducing
provision poses an unacceptable risk of harming consumer welfare by denying to rivals a reasonable opportunity to participate efficiently in the market
23
The
and whether it does so without a sufficient efficiency justification."'
European
the
from
the
test
of
Crane-Miralles proposal is a reformulation
Commission's Guidance just discussed and is an impressive attempt to simplify and unify a vertical restraints framework. First, its grounding in the
conceptual framework employed by the European Union maximizes the
chance that European authorities would accept it. Second, it reformulates
the European Commission's concepts into language familiar to American
courts, thereby increasing the chances of the proposal being adopted in the
U.S. Third, the Crane-Miralles proposal nicely combines the two prevalent
U.S. judicial tests governing exclusive distribution: the substantial share
test derived from Standard Stations and Tampa Electric that traditionally
has governed exclusive supply contracts and the price-cost test derived
from Brooke Group.'24 Finally, although the proposal incorporates two of
the current U.S. judicial tests, it preferences the Brooke Group price-cost
test by making proof of below-cost sales a sine qua non of liability where
that test applies.'25 That is, if a rival supplier is able to match an incumbent
supplier's price and other relevant terms to a buyer, the rival has a reasona123

Crane & Miralles, supra note 8, at 607.

124

The price-cost test is part of the Crane-Miralles "reasonable sales opportunity" component of

their overall test. See Crane & Miralles supra note 8, at 634. That "reasonable sales opportunity" is
then combined with the substantial share component taken from Standard Stations and Tampa Guidance.
125 Crane & Miralles, supra note 8, at 634-35.
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ble sales opportunity. Nevertheless, like the EU approach, their proposal
glosses over some central difficulties and adds some of its own.
The Crane-Miralles proposal, like the Guidance (and the U.S. courts),
employs a two-step process to determine when conduct violates the antitrust
laws. The writers first develop an idiosyncratic use of the term "foreclosure."' 26 Under their usage, foreclosure is present whenever an existing
arrangement prevents a seller's rivals from having a "reasonable sales opportunity" to make a sale.'27 For example, in NieSand, the plaintiff,
NicSand, had a reasonable opportunity to make the sales in question. It
could have undercut 3M without selling below cost, but did not. Thus,
there was no "foreclosure" because little stood in the way of NicSand displacing essentially any amount of 3M's sales, so NicSand failed step one of
the Crane-Miralles test. Under that test, the case would be dismissed.
Without employing the Crane-Miralles language, the Sixth Circuit in
NicSand applied essentially their reasoning to rule in favor of 3M.
If a plaintiff fails to establish "foreclosure" (in the Crane-Miralles
sense) by the defendant, he fails the first step in their analysis, and the case
is over; there is no need to proceed to the second step. However, if the
plaintiff succeeds in establishing foreclosure, the case moves to the second
step, where the plaintiff must prove the "substantiality" of the aggregate
foreclosure on the entire market.'28 Although Crane and Miralles took the
"substantiality" term from the U.S. exclusive-supply cases where it originated and from the European Commission which has adopted it as a standard of assessing the market effects of a restraint, they acknowledge the
term's indefiniteness and argue that it "should be given a functional, economic definition."' 29 They then translate this definition as according the
plaintiff a "reasonable survival opportunity."' 3 ° Under the reasonable survival opportunity test:
[F]oreclosure is not problematic unless an equally efficient rival would lack a reasonable opportunity to obtain a sufficient share of the nonforeclosed portion of the market to reach minimum viable scale. 131

Crane and Miralles largely ignore the difficulties arising from differentiated-product competition outlined above where the very concept of an
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contractual terms that the customer reasonably might choose in lieu of the defendant's terms for some
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equally efficient firm is brought into question when differentiated products
of varying costs sell at varying prices and margins. Moreover, in the case
of some vertical restraints, such as targeted loyalty discounts, that part of
the market open to contestation may be hard to estimate.
While Crane and Miralles stress the relevance of the non-foreclosed
part of the market growing or shrinking for minimum viable scale, they
treat that crucial market feature as largely independent of the efforts of the
entrant. They do not explicitly consider the possible erosion of the initially
"foreclosed" part resulting from targeted expenditures by the challenger
despite their explicit recognition that the acceptance of new offerings varies
greatly across industries and sometimes that acceptance grows quite rapidly. 32
' Thus, in their approach, the incumbent bears the burden of disproving
the strength and permanency of its foreclosure. Foreclosure, however, is
defined in part by its effects on rivals.
Crane and Miralles explicitly reject prevailing market share minima
for foreclosure in both the U.S. and the EU. We agree with their observation that "market share numbers, picked from the air [such as 30 or 40%],
are utterly arbitrary from an economic perspective. Whether foreclosure is
substantial in an economic sense depends on whether the quantity of the
33
In
foreclosure prevents rivals from functioning efficiently in the market."'
our terms, Crane and Miralles here are describing limiting foreclosure.
Limiting foreclosure, of course, is necessarily measured over the entire
market and (whether or not it is accompanied by strategic foreclosure) its
effects can matter greatly.
After assessing its strength and effectiveness, Crane and Miralles ultimately apply a quantitative meaning to unlawful foreclosure: "[a]s a general
rule, we propose that foreclosure should not be deemed substantial if the
minimum viable scale, expressed in units or revenues, is less than the units
or revenues in the nonforeclosed segment of the market divided by the
number of competitors."' 34 Their explanation suggests an assumption that
each competitor, including the foreclosing incumbent or incumbents, has an
equal shot at a pro-rata share of the non-foreclosed part of the market but
not at the foreclosed part. They explicitly assume that "over time, the new
entrant has an equal chance of winning business as every other competitor."' 35 However, for Crane and Miralles, "over time" is not a very long
time. Without explanation, they assume competitive parity between an
entrant and an incumbent in market acceptance over a period of one year.
On the other hand, they neglect that "over time" some of the foreclosed part
of the market may also be vulnerable. The advantages of the foreclosing
incumbent or incumbents remain unexplained parameters of the problem,
132
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although there is some recognition of the formal characteristics of the foreclosing devices themselves, such as length of exclusivity.
Crane and Miralles do not explore the implications of their quantitative standard. The larger the number of actual or potential suppliers the
smaller must be minimum viable scale for the arrangement to be lawful.
For example, assume there are two firms, the dominant incumbent and the
potential entrant. Assume further that the former has foreclosed 60% of the
market and minimum viable scale (MVS) in this market is equal to a 10%
market share. The foreclosure is lawful because the non-foreclosed market
(40%) divided by the two companies (the incumbent and the entrant) is
20%, which is greater than the 10% MVS. But, if there are four incumbents
plus the entrant jostling for a share, then the standard deems the foreclosure
illegal (40 divided by 5 = 8% < 10%). We need an explanation of why the
market is deemed uncompetitive with five participants but competitive with
two. The case involving five firms would appear, all else equal, to present
a potentially less coordinated response to the entrant. Moreover, the plausibility of the assumption of an equal chance at the unforeclosed market by
each player seems greater where the number of players is larger and the
shares are more equal. Finally, suppose one of the incumbents merges with
another. This appears under the Crane-Miralles proposal to make the market more amenable to new competition, a counterintuitive implication.
FTC Commissioner Joshua Wright has criticized the Crane-Miralles
proposal on two main grounds. First, he suggests that the difficulty of estimating minimum viable scale makes the first part of their approach "unadministrable."' 36 Wright admits that such estimates are often used in merger proceedings,' 37 but we agree that they should be avoided, if possible.
Wright is correct that the second prong of their approach, the attempt to
determine "reasonable survival opportunity," is pitched at such a high level
of abstraction as to be of little use.'38 The concept requires the identification of the factors underlying "a reasonable survival opportunity" to become operational.'39
The Crane-Miralles proposal can also be viewed through the lens of
standing. Doing so helps to identify the particular contribution of their proposal. In the first step of their analysis, the plaintiff must show that it was
denied a reasonable sales opportunity. This is a winnowing role analogous
to establishing standing in private antitrust actions, where the plaintiff must
show (antitrust) injury. 4 ° The second step uses a version of the substantialshare approach derived from Standard Stations4' and Tampa, 4 2 modified
136
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into "a reasonable survival opportunity" and operationalized by asking
whether minimum viable scale, expressed in units or revenues, is less than
the units or revenues in the non-foreclosed segment of the market divided
by the number of competitors. Despite the seeming limitations of their test,
Crane's and Miralles's focus on the aggregate market effects of the challenged restraint moves their proposal in the right direction. But much is left
unexplored. In particular, the great variety of both products and purchasers
in terms of their respective numbers, market shares, their power relationships and the significance of these factors for successful entry go largely
undeveloped.
Wright's Approach

C.

Joshua Wright's approach employs a concept-as he acknowledges,
not an original idea 43-of "But for Foreclosure" (BFF) that involves a
counterfactual analysis. BFF, however, while conceptually simple, is difficult to apply. Wright proposes that either cross-section or time series data
be used to determine the differences in market share that the vertical reTo use one of his examples, if a firm without
straint appears to generate.'
exclusive dealing boasts a 50% share and that rises to 55% with exclusivity,
then the BFF is 5%. "' The data problems surrounding the estimation could
be formidable because the competitive environment of the firm could vary
far more than its distributional practices.
Consider a situation based on a prominent recent case, already discussed. Suppose that Dentsply sells exclusively through dealers that (except for the grandfathering recognized in its distribution policy) handle only
its own brand of artificial teeth. As we understand Wright's BFF analysis,
we would undertake a counterfactual analysis to ascertain (as best we
could) the effects of its exclusive arrangements on its market share. In this
way, we would avoid attributing market effects to the exclusive arrangements that were the result of other causes. Thus, we could try to determine
what Dentsply's market share would have been absent its exclusive dealer
relations to get a better sense of the market effects of the exclusive arrangements. But, Dentsply had only recently instituted its exclusive policy.
The focus of the court's decision was on likely future effects. So the BFF
test would show little actual foreclosure and would do little to illuminate
the present or future competitive significance of the prevailing distribution
system.
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Despite these criticisms, it is clear that Wright's inquiry identifies an
important piece of what the law should be looking for. Much of the usefulness of his test, however, depends upon whether the judicial system is generally capable of providing adequately precise counterfactual assessments.'46 Counterfactual analysis has its own analytical challenges, especially when dealing with differentiated-product competition and strong
brand preferences. For example, a product strongly preferred by many
buyers may be sold under an exclusive-supply contract combined with a
loyalty-discount program or just under a loyalty-discount program. The
cumulative discount earned through "must have" purchases may generate
significant foreclosure effects on purchases in that part of their demand
where brand preference is muted or non-existent (this is the "suction effect"
identified by the European Commission'47 ). Under Wright's BFF analysis,
these purchasing restraints produce no effect on purchases that are made
under the influence of the product's brand attraction, but other purchases
are nonetheless influenced by the cumulative discount earned on the strongly preferred purchases. So the BFF can be a useful concept, but it may be
only an initial part of addressing a real competition problem.
Even if data permit the BFF to be calculated, its competitive significance remains unclear. For example, let's assume that a firm pioneered the
development of a particular product-perhaps based on patents or trade
secrets-and established an 80% market share, which is subsequently eroded to 50% by competitors employing their own improvements. The previously dominant firm then introduces exclusive dealing that raises its penetration to 45%. The calculated BFF would be 5%, but the firm might be
heavily insulated from future share erosion. This would be particularly
likely if nearly all of the rest of the market were in the hands of two other
firms, both of which employ effectively restrictive vertical practices that
protect their own market positions. And assume further that the "next big
thing" in product improvement lies in the hands of a firm that has not yet
entered what is an effectively foreclosed market. Under Wright's BFF approach, the innovator might be unable to enter the market despite what
looks like an innocuous practice because BFF focuses on the foreclosure
attributable to a particular defendant, regardless of the larger market context. In our terms, this denies the relevance of limiting foreclosure. In fact,
Wright argues strongly against attention to the cumulative effects of vertical
practices in a market and specifically attacks Einer Elhauge for advancing
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But this inquiry would be still more complex and perhaps

beyond the capabilities of the judicial system.
147 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supranote 43, at 44-45.

2017]

A COHERENT AND WORKABLE ANTITRUST POLICY

the contrary position, which Wright deems "not administrable."' 48 We disagree. The impact of any exclusive contract or similar relationship is a contextual matter. How much room is left for entry depends, not on a single
contract, but on all of the exclusive arrangements in the aggregate. This
was apparent even in Standard Stations where the Court observed that, in
addition to the defendant, "all the other major suppliers have also been using requirements contracts."'49 And the cumulative nature of foreclosure
was recognized in the DOJ's vertical restraints guidelines that were in force
Thus, in drawing the bounds of their safe harbor,
from 1985 until 1993.'
the guidelines made use of two concepts that were indices of cumulative
foreclosure: the Vertical Restraints Index and the coverage ratio. The Vertical Restraints Index squares the market share of each firm that is a party to
such a restraint, and adds the result.' 51 The coverage ratio is the percent of
each market involved in a restraint of the kind in question.'52 We think that
only a market-wide look at possibly restrictive practices will suffice to
serve as a welfare criterion, and an attempt to consider the entire market lies
at the heart of our proposal presented below.
The Lambert Contribution

D.

Thomas Lambert has recently attempted to unify the treatment of "Unreasonably Exclusionary Conduct."'53 Lambert suggests a general standard
for exclusion employing a concept different from, but closely related to, the
"equally efficient competitor" standard."' Lambert calls his standard "exclusion of a competitive rival" (ECR) to distinguish it from the "equally
efficient competitor" or "equally efficient rival" standard.'55 The ECR
standard is based on the excludability of "a rival that is as aggressive a
competitor as the defendant and would be capable at minimum efficient
scale (MES) ... of matching or exceeding the defendant's productive efficiency."' 56 Unless a defendant's behavior would jeopardize the existence of
such a rival, the defendant's behavior would be treated as lawful. The
claimed advantage of the ECR standard lies in its ability to offer safe havens for pro-competitive behavior that, because of its novelty, is vulnerable
to misperception by the courts as anticompetitive.
148
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Lambert's approach focuses on what we have called strategic foreclosure. He contends that a critical advantage of the ECR standard in making
safe harbors available for behavior generating unrecognized procompetitive effects lies in the ability of a defendant to "take steps to avoid
excluding truly competitive rivals."' 57 In Lambert's words:
Consider how a competitive rival would maintain (and, if necessary, grow) its scale in the
face of a competitor defendant's foreclosure-causing conduct. If truly determined, a rival
losing a significant number of customers because of the defendant's conduct would (after
exhausting all other reasonably available options for expanding its sales) seek to maintain
scale by offering to become a supplier to the defendant, ultimately lowering its price to the
level of its incremental cost at the scale it would achieve as a supplier, presumably MES
[footnote omitted]. If the rival could meet or beat the defendant's productive efficiency at
that scale, then any defendant that was pursuing efficiency rather than seeking to enhance its
market power by foreclosing rivals would be willing to accept the rival supplier's offer
[footnote omitted]. If a rival complaining of exclusion did not seek to become supplier to the
defendant or did not lower
its price to the level of its incremental cost at MES, then it was
58
not a determined rival.1

Lambert's suggestion that a rival become a supplier to a defendant engaging in apparently exclusionary conduct is highly problematic. The defendant would then be marketing not only its own output but also those of
its rival. If the rival ceased all production for its own independent sales and
converted itself into the defendant's supplier, instead of separate decisionmaking by the defendant and the rival about quantities and prices, all such
decision-making would now be consolidated in the defendant. In the situation described (where the defendant is dominant and the rival is its principal
competition), this combination would be a per se violation of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act.'59 Lambert deals with this issue by claiming that actual
instances of rivals becoming suppliers to a defendant would probably be
rare and by claiming that collusion between a rival and a defendant (by
coordinating their production levels) would be easily detected and prosecuted. 60
'
Regardless of legality, Lambert does not persuasively address the absence of effective horizontal competition. The mechanism explained would
apparently increase the profits of the dominant firm by lowering its cost
while doing nothing directly to increase product competition. While the
output of the weaker firm would expand by assumption, experience as a
supplier does not equip a firm to become a formidable competitor in differ157
158
159

Id. at 1215.
Id. at 1215-16 (emphasis added).
In United States v. Masonite Corp., Masonite settled patent litigation by becoming a supplier to

its former competitors. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 272-73 (1942). In this arrangement, price and output decisions were made exclusively by Masonite. This arrangement was held to be
in per se violation of the Sherman Act. Id.at 282. Lambert reverses the supply arrangement by making
the rivals suppliers to the dominant firm, but the centralization of decision-making is similar.
160 Lambert, supra note 9, at 1242-43.
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entiated product markets. The antitrust laws should seek to increase welfare through vigorous competition, not to keep firms in business.
Vertical restraint policy aims to prevent arrangements between suppliers and their customers that impede competition. Different rules apply to
exclusive-supply agreements, tying arrangements and loyalty and bundled
discounts in the U.S., while the EU has developed some innovative approaches to vertical problems, particularly bundled discounts. Some version of an "efficient competitor" test drawn from predatory pricing cases is
now widely employed on both sides of the Atlantic to evaluate several vertical restraints. This article argues, however, that most markets involve
differentiated products that render the approach problematic. We examine
proposals from other antitrust scholars for reforming and possibly unifying
the treatment of vertical restraints. All of these approaches are found wanting, and we suggest a simplified version of the rule of reason that is keyed
to changes in output and market-structure effects. This focus best equips
the proposal to evaluate restraints affecting differentiated-product competition. The proposal also incorporates safe harbors that are designed to protect innovative behavior from condemnation by courts that are unfamiliar
with its effects, and the burden of uncertainties falls on the plaintiff.
OUR PROPOSAL: THE RULE OF REASON WITH A Focus ON THE

V.

ULTIMATE ANTITRUST IMPERATIVE OF WELFARE

Our approach to the evaluation of the vertical restraints discussed here
(exclusive-supply arrangements, loyalty discounts and rebates, bundled
discounts and rebates, and tying arrangements) employs a simple version of
the rule-of-reason. Has output increased or decreased? 6' Our approach
uses several safe harbors. The first safe harbor applies when the unencumbered share of the entire market is more than 200% of the share of the
smallest viable incumbent. The second safe harbor is the price/cost test
derived from Brooke Group.'62 When the price/cost test can be applied,
passage of that test will immunize the defendant's conduct from challenge.
Third, restraints occurring in markets in which the Herfindahl index is less
than 2000 fall within a safe harbor. Finally, because our approach is based
upon the rule-of-reason, it presumes restraints lawful, imposing the burden
of proving otherwise on the party challenging them. This presumption,
while not set forth in precise metes and bounds, has the practical effect of
protecting a wide swath of behavior. We explain our proposal below..
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Except for tying arrangements where the defendant possesses power in
the tying product market, antitrust law subjects the restraints discussed here
to assessment under a nominal rule of reason standard, albeit with different
evaluative criteria. Our proposal shares with each of the critiques of U.S.
practice discussed above a basic commitment to rule-of-reason evaluation
and extends treatment under the rule-of-reason to tying arrangements. Our
version of the rule-of-reason standard, however, is closer to what we will
call a modernized Brandeis standard, in that it focuses directly on market
impact, eschewing preliminary evaluative steps. And the European Commission has also been pursuing a version what American antitrust observers
might call a rule-of-reason in its pursuit of "fact based" evaluation of challenged restraints. But agreement on a rule-of-reason approach by scholars,
judges, and other officials at this abstract level does not extend to concrete
applications. This is evident in all of the proposals and judicial practices
we have reviewed. At these less abstract levels, the differences in the several proposals are quite substantial. In current antitrust usage, these differences could be described as different approaches to a structured rule of rea-

son."' We think an application of the rule-of-reason should be sought that
is most likely to produce the desired result of condemning welfare-reducing
behavior while protecting socially-beneficial behavior from judicial condemnation that the courts do not yet fully understand.
Justice Brandeis's comprehensive description of the rule-of-reason in
his Chicago Board of Trade opinion'

is a version that is both unwieldy

163 Shortened or "structured" versions of the rule-of-reason have developed over the years to assess
"exploitative" restraints. A so-called "quick-look" version was employed in the NCAA and Indiana
Federation of Dentists cases. FTC v. Ind. Fed. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). Use of a "quick look" version, however, was rejected
in California Dental Association where the Court thought that the subject-matter was too complex and
ambiguous for a "quick look." Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999). Recently, in Leegin, the Court suggested that as the lower courts gain experience with a particular restraint, they will be
able to "establish the litigation structure to ensure that the rule [of reason] operates to eliminate anticompetitive restraints from the market and to provide more guidance to businesses." Leegin Creative
Leather Prods., Inc. v PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 879 (2007). According to the Leegin opinion, the
courts could do so by devising rules for offering proof, or even presumptions, making the rule of reason
"a fair and efficient" way of sorting out the anticompetitive from the procompetitive. Id. at 899. The
Court most recently reaffirmed this approach in its Actavis decision. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S.Ct.
2223 (2013). There the Court again recognized the desirability of devising shortened versions of the
rule of reason while avoiding the use of theories too abbreviated to permit proper analysis. 133 S.Ct. at
2238. The Court, however, left the working out of this litigation structure to the lower courts. Id.
164 Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). In that case, Justice Brandeis described the rule of reason as follows:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar
to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint
was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose
or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This in not because a good intention will
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and costly for both the parties and the courts, as critics often point out. But,
at base, the rule of reason, even under the Brandeis version, is violated
when output in the general market is reduced from the level that it would be
in a competitive market. Brandeis understood this and pointed out both that
in the case before him there was no adverse impact on prices in the general
market and that the challenged restraint expanded the market and created
efficiencies that allowed more grain "to arrive."
In some cases, it may be possible to measure aggregate market output
to reach a conclusion as to whether the rule has been violated. But the burden of uncertainty rests on the plaintiff and thus avoids false positives.
Sometimes the plaintiffs story involves uncompetitive prices throughout
and sometimes it suggests a price cut followed by a price rise (as in predatory pricing). In the latter case, output should increase in the short-run but
(if the plaintiff is correct) decrease in the long run. The evaluation of all
anti-competitive restraints that focus on consumer or total welfare necessarily involves the courts with static or dynamic counterfactuals.'65 In particular, the burden on the courts in cases involving vertical restraints can be
challenging when the relevant events may occur a year or more in the future. But such a burden is routinely borne in other realms such as predatory
pricing and merger cases.
Our approach to a rule-of-reason evaluation of vertical restraints can
be described as a direct one (a modernized Brandeisian version, as we have
argued above) or as a structured rule-of-reason (where the structure focuses
on output changes over time). A particular contribution of our proposal is
that the plaintiff bears the burden of uncertainty. As it would apply to allegedly exclusionary restraints, the plaintiff would contend that the defendant is expanding its own output at the expense of the plaintiff and is doing
so through means that cannot be justified on efficiency grounds.'66 But safe
harbors provide critical winnowing.
When either exclusive dealing or loyalty discounting-or both-are
pervasive in the market for a well-defined product that is sold under competitive conditions, such devices should not be suspect."' Thus we suggest
that in markets where the Herfindahl index is less than 2000, there is unlikely to be any serious antitrust concern. In more concentrated markets,
we suggest an examination of the market share of the smallest apparently
save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent
may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
Id.
165 Restraints can be both "exploitative" (immediate price raising) and "exclusionary" (expelling or
repelling rivals), although we stress the latter effect in this article.
166 As our earlier discussion of the Wright proposal argued, exploring "before" and "after" effects
of a restraint is challenging, but we think that demonstrating harm is appropriately borne by the plaintiff.
167 This paper deals with market power by incumbent sellers but allows for aggressively bargaining
"power buyers." Competitive suppliers dealing with powerful buyers present problems of monopsony
that are beyond the scope of this work.
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viable seller in the market, whether that firm employs these vertical restrictions or not. We propose a safe harbor if exclusive dealing or targeted
or bundled discounting leaves more than 200 percent of the share of the
smallest viable seller unencumbered by such restrictions. This is meant to
capture a situation in which there is an adequate part of the market open to
unimpeded contestation, where "adequate" is calculated conservatively
relative to the scale of an actual market participant. Where the safe harbor
is inapplicable, vertical restrictions may be challenged.
Why do we prefer this safe harbor to the one contained in the now
withdrawn Vertical Restraints Guidelines?'68 The Guidelines established a
safe harbor if (1) the firm employing the restraint had a market share of
10% or less; or (2) the Vertical Restraints Index was below 1,200 and the
coverage ratio 69 was below 60% in the same (supplier or dealer) market; or
(3) the Vertical Restraints Index was below 1,200 in both the supplier and
dealer markets; or (4) the coverage ratio was below 60% in both supplier
1
and dealer markets. 70
We have no quarrel with this safe harbor. We believe, however, that our proposed safe harbor is superior because it is simpler and less cumbersome, yet it will still exclude truly problematic arrangements.
Under our approach to the rule-of-reason, all arrangements would be
presumed lawful, with the plaintiff bearing the burden of proving otherwise.
In particular, challenges to practices that involve price discounting would
have to overcome a presumption that lower prices tend to increase output
and generally benefit final purchasers. This presumption would need to be
countered with a persuasive case that the apparent increase in output and
accompanying price decrease were misleading and that ultimately marketwide sales to final purchasers were likely to decrease and prices were likely
to rise, or have risen, as a result of the restrictions.
We propose a focus on aggregate market effects: has the market structure moved significantly in an anticompetitive direction or not? In calling
for an inquiry into the probable effects of a defendant's behavior on market
structure, we are focusing on the ultimate concern of the antitrust laws: the
maintenance of a competitive market structure. To connect the defendant's
behavior with probable market effects that occur in the future will be a
challenge to the courts, but it is a challenge that they can handle. Courts
currently perform similar tasks in predatory pricing cases when they resolve
issues of recoupment. Thus in a predatory pricing context, recoupment is
possible only if the defendant's behavior produces critical changes in market structure, changes that generate new market power and enable the defendant to recover its earlier losses. The Court in Brooke Group, for example, was able to decide for the defendants because the plaintiff had failed to
168
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Our approach, like that of Crane and Miralles, the EU Guidance and at
least some U.S. courts, makes use of the price/cost test used in Brooke
Group. When the test applies, it serves as a negative filter. A defendant
who passes the test is entitled to judgment. This test, however, when taken
out of the specific predatory-pricing context in which it originated, either
does not work (as illustrated by Dentsply, Eaton, and Mc Wane) or is prone
to a number of errors, so its limitations need to be recognized. Thus that
test does not work in certain common situations and it ignores the problems
inhering in many differentiated product markets. The Sixth Circuit employed that test in NieSand, and the European Commission holds itself open
to using that test in its Guidance. But the European Guidance recognizes
that the test does not always work. And Dentsply, Eaton, and Me Wane
illustrate the limitations of that standard: in those cases the standard did not
work because the more entrenched firm enjoyed such superior (and lasting)
product acceptance that it was largely immune to undercutting by rivals.
That standard can be defended in the abstract, but where products are highly differentiated, inputs of similar cost may be producing outputs of quite
differing value as judged by the market.'72 Thus the "as efficient competitor" test will more likely accomplish its intended purpose where firms both
produce at similar costs and sell at similar prices. 173 Where that is not the
74
case the test will systematically tend towards type 2 errors' even if both
the challenger and incumbent evaluate the "contestable" share accurately.
Where price-cost similarities make the price/cost analysis meaningful,
we accept Baumol's average avoidable cost as a generally superior standard
to average variable cost'75 in predatory and related antitrust analyses.
Again, however, average avoidable cost has its limitations. Such a standard
simply does not work in many circumstances in which large front end expenditures are made followed by negligible marginal costs-as in software.
On the other hand, attempts to oblige firms to build any particular level of
total cost recovery into their pricing through some use of Baumol's related
LAIC (long run average incremental cost) concept may be unworkable.
Only a full examination of the behavior of the dominant firm will suffice.
Our suggested framework addresses the apparent competitive effect of
a firm's challenged vertical practice on other firms competing for sales to
buyers but places all such issues in the context of their impact on the general market. It also weighs any possible impediments to competition
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against increased efficiency and thus judges them under a consumer (or
total) 76 welfare standard. Finally, we believe that our framework can help
resolve issues raised by differentiated-product competition.
Our approach deals better with differentiated-product competition than
any of the other approaches reviewed here. The EU Guidance mentions
established distribution channels as a barrier to entry, but otherwise product
differentiation is treated only as an on-off switch to motivate buyers' purchases of "must have" products. The strength and obduracy, and not just
the existence, of a brand advantage is necessary for consideration of the
competitive prospects of an entrant. Such considerations as the industry's
market share stability and its history of acceptance of new products must be
considered directly. It is the cumulative impact of these factors that attests
to the practical exclusionary impact on entrants and that, in turn, affects the
competitiveness of the market structure. In most cases, strong brand preference will be unproblematic from an antitrust perspective. But the failure
of antitrust analysis to develop an approach to differentiated product competition has left a gap that occasionally adversely affects judicial analysis.
Thus, in LePage's, the Third Circuit treated 3M's "Scotch" brand sticky
tape as a monopoly, even though it was competing with LePage's physically similar product, and the technology involved was easy to master.'77
Again, although Intel's microprocessors are similar to AMD's and the two
companies enjoy a duopoly in that industry, the European Commission
treated Intel as a dominant firm and ignored AMD's persistent hold of 30%
of the microprocessor market.'78 Since our proposal directs attention to
market structure, it is uniquely equipped to assess antitrust issues raised by
differentiated product competition.
If similar distributors are available to rival suppliers at a competitive
price and there are no significant scale economies at the distribution level,
the whole issue of exclusive dealing and discounting dissolves. In sharp
contrast, if downstream commerce is not distribution but physical incorporation, a fixed constellation of buyers may simply need to be faced. Intel
and AMD, for example, had no control over the configuration of the set of
computer manufacturers who were their customers. Many situations fall in
between. Our approach recognizes that both the choice of vertical restraints
and their possible anticompetitive effects depend on the characteristics of
both the upstream and downstream markets.
Our proposal avoids the complexities of Crane and Miralles in their
explication of the reasonable survival test that involves comparing estimat176

The simple "does output go up or down?" rule that underlies the consumer surplus standard

must be broadened for the total surplus standard to apply to the economy as a whole and not just to the

product market in question.
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ed minimum viable scale with the non-foreclosed part of the market divided
by the number of competitors. We also avoid deficiencies in Joshua
Wright's "but for foreclosure" that ignores aggregate market foreclosure in
favor of foreclosure attributed to a particular defendant. And we avoid the
antitrust problems inherent in Thomas Lambert's "exclusion of a competitive rival" test under which he would tolerate (and even encourage) a rival
supplier to transform a competitive relationship to a dominant supplier into
a supplier/customer relationship when necessary to maintain minimum efficient scale.
Finally, our approach forthrightly recognizes that the law governing
tying must be overhauled. As argued earlier, tying is typically innocuous
from the standpoint of competition policy. Moreover, it often involves
product design in which another market-distribution-is not a critical part
of the analysis. Sometimes the distinction is blurred: Microsoft pressured
other firms into favoring its browser and media player for use with their
products before testing the legality of incorporation.
We would abolish the per se approach to tying arrangements. There
should be no recognized tie between perfect complements used in a fixed
ratio, because they should be deemed a single product and subject to the
strictures of the single monopoly theorem.'79 The use of complements in
variable proportions should be recognized as typically a device to facilitate
output expansion. Such second-degree price discrimination increases seller
profits, but, as previously noted, it may often also increase consumer surplus. The practice is generally not an antitrust problem. Moreover, the sale
of two "monopoly" goods tied together avoids double marginalization, an
important efficiency gain.
Our rule-of-reason approach would inquire as to whether the total value of the dominant product plus the tied product is increased or decreased
by the tie or, alternatively whether consumer surplus is increased across the
two products. This logic applies to Microsoft's incorporation of new features into its Windows operating system, which-apart from ties that suppress the development of alternatives to its operating system (an issue that
underlay the U.S. antitrust case)-should be evaluated similarly. As the
Microsoft antitrust case has demonstrated, it is also possible that such an
incorporation could, in certain unusual circumstances, generate anticompetitive effects. In the Microsoft case, the unusual circumstances were
the combination of the seller's monopoly over the tying product (platform
for software applications) with the potential of the rival to the tied product
(the browser) to develop into an alternative platform, thus breaking the tying's product's platform monopoly. Our version of the rule-of-reason,
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whose primary focus is on the structure of the supplier market, would have
identified these critical circumstances.
CONCLUSION

This paper stresses that the welfare effects of each of the practices discussed should, to the extent possible, be determinative of the lawfulness of
those practices. The purpose of each of the forms of a structured rule of
reason we propose is to assist the judiciary in discovering and upholding
practices that increase welfare and to bar practices that decrease welfare.
Production and distribution efficiency must necessarily be important criteria
in these determinations because the lower the cost of producing and delivering the product, the greater will be the likely welfare effects. All of the
practices considered here have been employed in highly competitive markets and such employment suggests a potential both to reduce cost and to
lower prices."' Thus a heavy burden of showing a reduction in consumer
welfare lies appropriately with the challenger.

180 The latter effect is less dependable and suggests that, all else equal, positive effects of efficiency will be recognized more under an aggregate welfare standard than they will be under a consumer
welfare standard because the latter standard only recognizes benefits accruing to consumers.

